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SOME COMMENTS ON THE SECTION OF THE MIN-
NESOTA STATUTE OF FRAUDS RELATING
TO CONTRACTS
By ROBERT KINGSLEY*
OR over two hundred and fifty years, the Statute of Frauds has
been a source of discussion and criticism, much of it acrimon-
ious. Of the principal sections which have been retained in our mod-
ern law,' those relating to the conveyance, leasing, and contracts for
the sale of land, and to the creation and transfer of trusts, have
received wide and full treatment; and the old seventeenth sec-
tion, relating to the sale of goods, has received the benefit of
the scrutiny of the draftsmen of the Uniform Sales Act, in which
in its present form, it is now embodied.2 But, by comparison,
the old fourth section has been neglected by the writers, though
not by the courts.
The purpose of the present paper is to classify the Minne-
sota decisions on this one section,3 and to comment briefly on
those points which seem to call for comment. It does not attempt
to state fully the whole law of Minnesota on the subject. Only
those problems have been discussed which have been considered
by the Minnesota court. For discussion of the other problems,
which have not yet arisen in Minnesota, the reader is referred
to the general works on the subject. Since the paper is, thus, con-
cerned primarily with the rules of the one jurisdiction, reference
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Southern California; form-
erly (1926-27) Instructor in Law, University of Minnesota.
'Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sees. 8456, 8459, 8460, 8379.2Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8379.3Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456:
"No action on agreement, when--No action shall be maintained in
either of the following cases, upon any agreement, unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in
writing, and subscribed by the party charged therewith:
1. Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof.
2. Every special promise to answer for the debt, default, or doings
of another.
3. Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
4. Every agreement, promise or undertaking to pay a debt which has
been discharged by bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings."
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has been made to decisions in other jurisdictions only for the
purpose of explaining or indicating the wisdom of the Minnesota
rules.
The problems to be discussed fall under three main heads:
1. What contracts are, by their nature, within the terms of
the statute, i.e., to what kinds of contracts is the statute applicable ?'
2. What formalities satisfy the requirements of the statute?7
3. What is the effect of the statute on those contracts which,
although of a type to which the statute is applicable, have not
been created in accordance with its requirements?G
I. To WVHAT KINDS OF CONTRACTS IS THE STATUTE A IPLICABLE?
A. CONTRACTS NOT TO BE, PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR
"Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof."--
In effect, this means contracts which, by their terms, do not
contemplate the possibility of being fully performed within one
year. In other words, certain contracts, although they may pos-
sibly run for a period longer than one year, are not within the
statutory bar, because the parties had in contemplation, at the
time they entered into them, the possibility of their terms being
fully carried out within that time. Thus, a contract which, al-
though it is to run for an indefinite period, can be terminated by
either party at will is not under the ban," nor is a contract of
fire insurance, since both parties contemplate the possibility of
destruction of the property and payment of the loss before the
policy has been in force a yearY
4Below, pp. 747-757.
5Below, pp. 757-760.
6 Below, pp. 760-768.7Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (1).
"Cowles v. Warner, (1876) 22 Minn. 449, where it was said:
"If, however, beginning within the year, it was to continue in force
for an indefinite period of time, with the right to either party to terminate
it at any moment before expiration of such year, and its obligations were
of such a character that they could all be performed within that period,
without contravening any of its terms, then it was without the statute, and
was a valid and binding contract"; accord: Stitt v. Rat Portage Lbr. Co.,(1906) 98 Minn. 52, 107 N. W. 824, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 191, 116 Am.
St. Rep. 387.
9Wiebler v. Milwaukee Mechanics Mut. Ins. Co., (1883) 30 Mimr. 464,
16 N. W. 363, where it was said that the statute:
"of course, does not include an agreement that may, in accordance
with its terms, be fully performed and ended within the year; as where the
thing to be done depends on a contingency that may happen within the time.
This is the case with a contract to insure, where the insurance is to
commence within the year."
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Oral contracts of hiring for a term of service of more than
one year, however, although there is a possibility of the servant's
death within that period, which would terminate the contract,"'
are nevertheless under the terms of the statute," since such a
possibility cannot, properly, be said to have been in the con-
templation of the parties; and so, also, are contracts of hirin,
for a one year term to begin in the future."
It is also obvious that although a contract does not in so
many words provide that its performance shall continue into a
second year, yet if it shows from its entirety that such was the
intention, it is under the statute."
On the other hand, the court held in the case of Langaun v.
Inverson'4 that if one party has already fully performed, or if he
is fully to perform his part within one year. or does so perform,
then the contract is not under the statute.
The general statement at the opening of this section"5 may be
changed, then, to read:
"A contract which, by its terms, does not contemplate the )Os-
sibility of being fully performed on either side, within one year
from the date of its making."
It requires no argument to show that oral leases where the
term is for more than one year are under this section of the
statute, as well as under those relating to interests in land.' 1 But
if the term is for one year only, so that these latter sections do
not apply, can the instant section still be applicable? The first
problem relates to such oral leases where the term is to begin in
the future, for example, an oral lease, made on January 30th,
for a year term to commence on February Ist. This agree-
"o3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1940. p. 3296-7.
"1La Du-King Mfg. Co. v. La Du, (1887) 36 Minn. 473, 31 N. W. 938.
12Kriger v. Leppel, (1889) 42 Minn. 6, 43 N. W. 484; Lally v. Crookston
Lbr. Co., (1902) 85 Minn. 257, 88 N. W. 846; O'Donnell v. Daily News
Co., (1912) 119 Minn. 378, 138 N. E. 677.
13Veagie v. Morse, (1896) 67 Minn. 100, 69 N. W. 637, where the
agreement was to reimburse a mortgagee for his foreclosure bid in caso
the mortgagor did not redeem within the year allowed by the statute;
Grand Forks Lbr. Co. v. McClure Logging Co., (1908) 103 Minn. 471,
115 N. W. 406, which was a contract for the delivery of seventy-seven
million feet of lumber, at the rate of nine to twelve million feet per year.
14(1889) 78 Minn. 299, 80 N. W. 1051 ; accord, Kruse v. Tripp,(1915) 129 Minn. 252, 152 N. W. 538; McRae v. Feigh, (1919) 143 Minn.
241, 173 N. W. 655; and probably Hammell v. Feigh, (1919) 143 Minn. 115,
173 N. W. 570.
"-Ante, p. 747.
'
0Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sees. 8459, 8460; cf. Browne, Statute of
Frauds, 5th ed., 359.
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ment, clearly, cannot be fully performed until the expiration of
one year and two days. It falls, theretore, within the terms of the
statute as rephrased above. Such has been the Minnesota holding.
The first Minnesota case 7 on the point was dictum, the court
finding that there was no showing that the agreement was made
before the term began, and stating, generally, the ordinarv rule.,
of the statute.1" The first square holding was in the case of
Jellett v. Rhode." In that case the court pointed out, logically
enough it would seem, that there was no difference between such
a contract and any other,20 so far as it concerned the evil against
which the statute is aimed. This rule has been followed in the
subsequent cases.'
These were cases of oral leases calling for a monthly pay-
ment of rent. But suppose the agreement were that the lessee
should pay a year's rent in advance on the first day of the term.
Would not his part of the contract be fully performed on that day,
and the case fall under the rule of Langan !,. Iverson ?" This
depends on the real meaning of the rule of that case. It is ex-
pressly based, as are the other American cases in accord with it,
on a line of English cases, the first of which was Donnellon -'.
Read.2 These were cases where the only "performance" left for
defendant was the payment of money, and hence, as has been
pointed out,2- the only real question was whether plaintiff should
recover in an action on the contract, or in quantum meruit using
the contract as evidence of his debt. It will be obvious that such
a rule does not necessarily support a contention that where plain-
tiff has fully performed his part within the year, defendant can
be compelled to do an act, or otherwise perform the contract in
a manner other than the mere payment over of the contract price.
17Mackey v. Potter, (1886) 34 Minn. 510, 26 N. W. 906.
'The court said only, ". . . in cases where it [the statute] does apply,
it must appear that the agreement cannot be performed, according to
its terms, within one year from the time when it was made."
19(1890) 43 Minn. 166, 45 N. W. 13.20
"The evil result[s] likely to follow from allowing such a contract,
the performance of which is to be long postponed, to rest in parol, without
any written evidence showing the terms of the agreement, are of the same
nature, and just as likely to occur, as in the case of arly other contract."
Jellett v. Rhode, (1890) 43 Minn. 166, 167, 45 N. W. 13.21Johnson v. Albertson, (1892) 51 Minn. 333, 53 N. WV. 642; Brosius v.
Evans, (1903) 90 Minn. 521, 97 N. W. 373.
22(1839) 78 Minn. 299, 80 N. W. 1051. See text to footnote 14.
23(1832) 3 Barn. & Ad. 899.
24Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., 382-6, sec. _90; consult also,
Dufree v. O'Brien, (1888) 16 R. L 213, 14 At. 857.
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In fact, one court, in allowing a money recovery, seemed ex-
pressly to draw this distinction.25 Not all the courts have made
this distinction, however. The Wisconsin case 2° cited by the
court to sustain Langan v. Iverson21 was a case where defendant's
"performance" was to be the withdrawal from competition, and
this has been followed in other jurisdictions." The Minnesota
court has not squarely considered the point. In one case, Hammel
v. Feigh,2 9 the court indicated that it would apply Langan v.
Iverson" to a situation where defendant's "performance" was
the making of an accounting:
"This is an action for an accounting. The parties, as is noted
later, accomplished the main purpose of their partnership. They
performed, or at least the plaintiff did. The contract of partner-
ship is no longer executory and the statute is without application
to the present situation."
But the language there is, to say the least, equivocal, and, in any
case, it may well be urged again that this is not strictly a suit
on the contract but merely a use of it to show a duty to account.
The question must, then, be left unanswered. If the court
decides to follow the orthodox reasoning which supports the
main rule, then the reversal of situation would leave this contract
within the statute; but if the court follows the more liberal
language of some of the other cases, such a contract might well
be supported.
So far, the established rules are relatively clear, and in the
main, in accord with legal opinion the country over.5' One last
25Dufree v. O'Brien, (1888) 16 R. I. 213, 14 Atd. 857, where the court
said, at p. 217, " . . . there is . . . a wide distinction between a case where
one seeks to enforce a verbal contract more than a year after it was made,
when witnesses to its terms may have died, or from lapse of time have lost
their clear recollection of executory stipulations, and a case where one
simply seeks to recover payment for a benefit received."
26Washburn v. Dosch, (1887) 68 Wis. 436, 32 N. W. 551.
27(1889) 78 Minn. 299, 80 N. W. 1051.
2Cf., for example, Smalley v. Greene, (1880) 52 Iowa 241, 3 N. W. 78.
29(1919) 143 Minn. 115, 173 N. W. 570.
30(1889) 78 Minn. 299, 80 N. W. 1051.
aiThe only proposition so far discussed on which there is an appear-
ance of conflict is Jellett v. Rhode, (1890) 43 Minn. 66, 45 N. W. 13. As is
pointed out in that case, the cases apparently contra to it can be explained
on one of the three grounds:
1. The cases arising under a statute which, like the English statute,
allows oral leases for three years-thus indicating a legislative purpose to
exclude leases from the "contracts not to be performed within one year."
2. The New York cases decided on the basis of a legislative action
amending the "land" section which had formerly read "oral leases tor one
year from the naking thereof" by omitting the italicized words, thus indicat-
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situation remains, however, which is not so dear. Suppose that
A on January 2nd orally agrees with B that on February 1st
they will execute formally a written contract or lease, for a term
of one year to begin on February 1st. Does the statute apply
to this situation? The Minnesota court has held that it does.
The question seems first to have been raised in this state in 1896,'2
and the court indicated that the agreement fell under the ban
of the statute, but this was dictum, and the case actually went off
on a question of evidence. lkive years later, the question was
again before the court in Taylor v. Times Neu.spaper Co.3s In
that case, plaintiff had submitted to the defendant company a
"secret plan" tor procuring advertising. The parties had signed
an agreeient, which was not formally correct under tne statute
as it did not express the consideration, by the terms of which
the company agreed to examine the plan and if it decided to
accept it, to enter into a formal contract; if not, to return the
plan. It also provided that if defendant did use the plan without
executing the formal contract, it should be liable to pay to plain-
tiff certain percentages of the earnings, as liquidated damages.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant, after claiming to reject the plan,
had actually used it, in violation of this agreement. He was met
at the outset by the claim that he was barred from relief by the
statute. This objection, the court briefly, and without discussion,
rejected in these words:
"Contracts held void under the first sub-division of . . .
[Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8546] ... are such only as cannot
by their terms be performed within a year; and the contract or
preliminary agreement here under consideration does not come
within that class." 34
ing, according to familiar rules of construction, a desire to permit "future"
leases.
3. Those cases arising under statutes whose titles indicate the "one year"
section should apply only to "goods, chattels and things in action."
2Engle v. Schneider, (1896) 66 Minn. 388, 69 N. W. 139.
33(1901) 83 Minn. 523, 86 N. W. 760.
34The discussion in the briefs of contracts is equally unsatisfactory.
Practically the point is not considered. Appellant's brief does not mention
the point at all; respondent's comment is as follows: " . . that document
... consists of several parts:
(a) An agreement to enter into a formal contract 'on terms to be
mutually agreed upon' if the Times decides to adopt the plan, and to make
such formal contract before putting the plan into operation.
(b) An agreement to pay the penalty stipulated if the first agree-
ment is violated and the plan put into operation without first making the
formal contract.
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For a year, the situation stood thus, with a dicttuni runnig
one way, and an unexplained holding tending the other. Then,
in 1902, the problem arose in a third case, Cram v. Thompson. "3
This case involved a lease. There had been an oral agreement
by defendant to take plaintiff's store and to execute a written lease
therefor when it had been rebuilt ready for his company. The
plaintiff tried the case in both the court below and in the appel-
late court on the theory that he had an oral "lease," and devoted ls
whole effort to an attempt to prove that his actions were a part
performance sufficient to take the situation out of the effect of the
statute. There was no suggestion, on either side, that the agreement
was anything else,36 so that, by its terms, the statute would not
apply. In this situation, the court introduced its consideration of
the real problem by the simple introductory remark that:
"The agreement for the future execution of the lease was void,
as it was not in writing, and could not be performed within a
year." 37
The last pronouncement of the court was in 1915. In a case,
Hanson v. Marion," very similar on its face to Cram v. Thomp-
son,3" the problem was squarely raised. The court indicated that
it considered the remark in the Cram Case0 to be a binding
decision.41 The nature of that case has just been pointed out. Tech-
(c) An agreement to notify the plaintiff if the Times decides not to
take the plan, so that plaintiff may open negotiations with other newspapers
in the city.
(d) An agreement not to give anyone interested in any newspaper
outside of the city any details of the plan.
(e) An agreement not to make, or permit anyone else to make, a
copy oi any part oi the plan while in the possession of the Times for
examination.
No consideration is expressed in this "memorandum" for any of these
several agreements on the part of the Times Co., and the stipulation (h)
cannot by its terms be performed within one year. (Respondent's brief,
p. 6.)
Hence it will be seen that neither side properly argued the question
of whether the agreement listed as "a" by respondent came under the statute.
35(1902) 87 Minn. 172, 91 N. W. 483.
3 6The case is classified in Dunnell as a case of an oral "lease."
6 Dunnell's Digest, 2nd ed., sec. 8863, note 38.
37Cram v. Thompson, (1902) 87 Minn. 172, 173, 21 N. W. 483.
38(1915) 128 Minn. 468, 151 N. W. 195.
39(1902) 87 Minn. 172, 91 N. W. 483.
40 Supra at footnote 36.4 t The court said, "The . . . contention . . . is dlisposed of by Cram v.
Thompson, [(1902) 87 Minn. 172, 91 N. W. 483].... It was there expressly
held that an oral contract to execute a lease, which when executed would
extend for a period beyond one year, was within the statute and unenforce-
able. The question was squarely decided in that case and the (lecisioi must
be deemed as settling the law on the subject in this state." Hanson v.
Marion, (1915) 128 Minn. 468, 471, 151 N. W. 195.
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nically, the statement may have been "holding," but it was made
without the benefit of argument by counsel, and without, appar-
ently, any real consideration by the court. It would seem, there-
fore, that, under usual rules of construction, the court was in
error in supposing that the Cram Case-' was binding on it on
this point.
4 3
But the court appended to its reference to the earlier case, a
brief statement of its reasons for refusing to depart from its
earlier language. It said:
"The agreement to enter into such lease is of no greater validity
than an oral contract of lease, had one been entered into instead
of the agreement to do so. If the oral agreement to enter into
a lease which by the statutes44 . . . is required to be in writing, be
held valid, then the purpose of the statutes is wholly nullified, and
may be avoided in all cases . . . We . . . discover no sufficient
reason for departing from the rule of the Cram Case, and there-
fore follow and apply it as there laid down."" .
If the court was wrong in holding that there was a prior
decision by which it was bound, this reasoning must stand as
the real basis of the rule. Consequently its validity is worthy of
consideration. Would the purpose of the statute be as much
defeated by allowing this contract, as by allowing the one last
discussed? The answer to this question depends on the answer
to the more fundamental question: what is the real purpose of
the statute? The statements in the authorities seem to indicate
two closely related purposes: first, to make actual fraud and
forgery more difficult, by providing for a mode of proof rela-
tively difficult to "manufacture,' 64 and second, and this is prob-
42Cram v. Thompson, (1902) 87 Minn. 172, 91 N. W. 483.
4
3 An error which is rendered the more curious by the fact that the
unauthoritative nature of the previous case was clearly pointed out by
counsel for the appellant on page 20 of his brief:
"It will no doubt be claimed that the supreme court of this state has
announced a doctrine contrary . . . and the case of Cram v. Thompson,
[(1912)] 87 Minn. 172, [91 N. W. 483] cited as authority for such claim.
While in that case the court may have used language which is in conflict
with the rule announced by the cases cited by plaintiff it did not pass on
the question in that case, as both parties assumed that the statute rendered
the contract invalid."
44Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat secs. 8456, 8460.
4,5Hanson v. Marion, (1915) 128 Minn. 468, 471, 151 N. NV. 195.
46"To secure defendants against unfounded and fraudulent claims."
1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 448, p. 862.
"The object of the statute of frauds, as its name indicates, was to
prevent men from being, through fraud or perjury, held liable for engage-
ments which they never made. To prevent this wrong it was eminently
proper that their promises or agreements (using the latter word in its
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ably the main purpose of that portion now under consideration,
to guard against the frailties of even honest memories, by pro-
viding for a more certain mode of proof in those cases where
the opportunities for forgetfulness are the greatest.
47
Applying these objects to the case in hand, it would seem that
the court erred in thinking that this class of contracts must be
held to be within the statute. The oral lease to begin in the future
carries with it the possibility of requiring that the parties and
their witnesses remember all its terms, for a period longer than
that which the legislature has decided is safe; but the oral
contract to execute a lease requires only such a remembrance tip
to the time fixed for making the lease, which is to be a less period
than that set.48  The authorities, as the court itself admits, are
in conflict on this point,4 9 and, as a matter of fact, some of the
popular sense) should be put into the durable form of a writing, and not
left to the uncertainty of verbal testimony." D. M. Osborne & Co. v.
Baker, (1885) 34 Minn. 307, 309-310, 25 N. W. 606.
47
"Indeed the real object and scope of the statute would seem to extend
far beyond all questions of the integrity of witnesses, and to comprehend
the exclusion of merely oral testimony in certain classes of transactions, as
at best of an uncertain and deceptive character." Browne, Statute of
Frauds, 5th ed., vii.
"The purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations depending for their enforcement upon the
unassisted memory of witnesses.... .27 C. J., Frauds, Statute of, sec.
1, p. 123 (italics the author's).48The facts of a recent case may serve to illustrate the proposition.
In Wm. Weisman Realty Co. v. Cohen, (1923) 157 Minn. 161, 195 N. W.
898, plaintiff claimed under an indorsement, made on April 11, 1919, on
the back of a lease which would not expire until Dec. 31, 1922, or more
than two years later, that:
"The lessee is hereby given the option of renewing this lease for a
period of five years from the expiration thereof ... upon giving six months
notice before expiration of his intention so to do," which did not satisfy
the statute by lack of a recital of consideration. Here the court quite
properly held the statute to apply. This agreement to "renew," was,
obviously, not to be performed, even by the execution of a new instrument,
until, at the earliest, six months prior to December 31, 1922, or more than
two years after the promise was made. Hence this was an agreement
which, in the language of our general rule, as given in the text to footnote
15 supra. "does not contemplate the possibility of being fully performed on
either side within one year from the date of its making."
49Hanson v. Marion, (1915) 128 Minn. 468, 471, 151 N. W. 195.
Contra to Hanson v. Marion are: Finucane v. Kearney, (1839) 1 Free.
Ch. (Miss.) 65; Eaton v. Whitaker, (1846) 18 Conn. 222, 44 Am. Dec. 586;
Henderson v. Touchstone, (1857) 22 Ga. 1; Shakespeare v. Alba, (1884)
76- Ala. 351; 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, 384, sec. 66a: ". . . since the
performance of such an agreement consists in the making of the lease, the
fact that the lease, when made, will extend until the expiration of a period
greater than a year from the date of the agreement should not, it seems
clear, bring the agreement within such provision;" Smith, Fraud 411, sec.
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authorities cited by the court as supporting its holding would
seem to be distinguishable.50 This being the case, it would seem
that the court, when the point again arises, might well consider
the proposition anew, with a full discussion of all the authorities
and of the application of the objects of the statute to this par-
ticular situation, a course it recently has followed in another
connection.51
It may be urged against any reconsideration that the present
rule has become established and should not be changed. Were
the situation reversed, this argument would have force. Even
though one does not believe that, under the rules of stare decisis,
a decision overruling a former decision should be prospective
only,12 still it is true that if contracts have been made in reliance
346 (e) ; see Smith v. Bowler, (1857) 1 Disn. (Ohio) 520, 526; Garner v.
Franzier & Foster, (Ky. 1909) 118 S. W. 998.
Accord with Hanson v. Marion are: Yates v. Martin, (1894) 2 Pin.
(Wis.) 171; Amburger v. Marvin, (1855) 4 E. D. Smith (N.Y.) 393;
Green v. Penn. Steel Co., (1891) 75 Md. 109, 23 At. 139; Hurley v.
Woodsichs, (1899) 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1073, 54 S. W. 8; Jordan v. Greensboro
Furnace Co., (1900) 126 N. C. 143, 35 S. E. 247, 78 Am. St. Rep. 644;
McMachlin v. Village of Whitehall, (1906) 114 App. Div. 315, 99 N. Y. S.
721; Clark v. City of Bradford Gas & Power Corp., (1916) 11 Del. Ch.
178, 98 Atl. 368; Little v. Union Oil Co., (1925) 73 Cal. App. 612, 238
Pac. 1066; Deutsch v. Textile Wante Mdse. Co. (1925) 212 App. Div.
681, 209 N. Y. S. 388; see, McKinley v. Lloyd, (C.C. Or. 1904) 128 Fed.
519; Donovan v. Maloney, (1912) 3 Boyce (Del.) 453, 84 AtI. 1032.
Sometimes cited as in accord with Hanson v.. Marion, but actually
distinguishable as being cases where the contract sought to be enforced was
the "ultimate" contract, and not the contract to execute a written contract.
are: Box v. Stanford, (1849) 13 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 93, 51 Am. Dec.
142; Caylor v. Roe, (1884) 99 Ind. 1; Donenmuhler v. Eilenberger, (1897)
70 Ill. App. 180; Appeal of Freeman, (1899) 69 N. H. 470, 43 At. 183;
Falk v. Devendorf, (1920) 172 Wis. 10, 177 N. V. 894.
Four cases found cited on the proposition do not seem to be in point
at all: Hawley v. Moody, (1852) 24 N. D. 603; Winteran v. Cherry.
(1883) 78 Mo. 344; Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., Ltd., (1904) 178
N. Y. 339, 70 N. E. 863; Howie v. Swaggard, (192-6) 142 Miss. 409, 107
So. 556.
500f the five cases cited by the court in support, one, Appeal of
Freeman, (1899) 69 N. H. 470, 43 Atl. 183, is distinguished above (note 49) ;
one, Hovell v. Sonnabend, (1906) 191 Mass. 310, 77 N. E. 764, was decided
on the ground of part performance; and one, Strehl v. D'Ever, (1872)
66 Ill. 77, while containing language in support was actually decided on the
ground that the alleged oral agreement to execute a written contract had
not been found.
5'Cf. Agard v. People's Nat'l Bank, Shakopee, (1927) 169 Minn. 438.
211 N. W. 825, where, although cited to previous discussions as far back
as volume 17 of the Minnesota Reports, the court said, "To whatever extent
our former decisions may have committed us, we have given the problem
a thorough reinvestigation with a view to choosing anew that side of the
issue which seems best supported by reason."
52For an excellent discussion of when a court decision overruling a
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upon a decision to the effect that they need not comply with
the requirements of the statute, it would be harsh and unjust to
penalize their makers unless the necessity for so doing was tin-
doubted and overwhelming. But in the present situation, no such
equity arises. The only person who could claim to have "relied"
on the present rule would be a man who had deliberately made
an agreement, intending to evade it later by invoking the bar of
the statute. Clearly little sympathy need be felt for him.
In conclusion, then, the rules of interpretation of this part
of the statute, so far as they have developed, are, in the main,
sound. Two things only require attention: first, a clear statement
of the extent to which the language of Langan v. Iverson-' is
to be carried; and second, a thorough reconsideration of the rule
of Hanson v. Marion5 4 in the light of the decisions in other states,
and the purposes of the statute.
B. PROMISE TO ANSWER FOR THE DEBT, DEFAULT OR DOINGS
OF ANOTHER
"Every special promise to answer for the debt, default or
doings of another.' ' 5
The problems arising under this section, although frequently
found and discussed in the works on the Statute of Frauds,'" are
equally those of the substantive law of suretyship. Interesting as
they are, they fall without the restricted scope of this paper.
C. AGREEMENTS UPON CONSIDERATION OF IMARRIAGE.
"Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon con-
sideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry."' 1
No case seems to have arisen in Minnesota in which the
applicability of this section was put in issue. In the first of the
former decision should be taken as prospective merely, consult (1927) 5
N. C. L. Rev. 170.
53(1889) 78 Minn. 299, 80 N. W. 1051.
54(1915) 128 Minn. 468, 151 N. W. 195.
5Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (2).
5 6Cf. Browne, Stat. of Frauds, ch. X, pp. 189-286; 27 C. J., Frauds,
Statute of, secs. 12-70.
For some other discussions of these problems, consult, (1924) 8
MINESOTA LAW REviEw, 628; Arnold, Indemnity Contracts and the Statute
of Frauds: Thomas v. Cook versus Green v. Creswell, (1925) 9 MINNIrSOTA
LAW RvIEW, 401 .
57Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (3).
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three cases' s in which it is referred to,"9 the court found from the
evidence that the defendant's promise was not made on consid-
eration of marriage but on another consideration, and that the
reference in the oral agreement to plaintiff's marriage was only
for the purpose of fixing the time of performance.
The second case60 admitted that the contract was within the
statute and was concerned solely with the problem of whether
the statutory requirements had been met; the third"' admitted
both that the statute applied and that its requirements had not
been compiled with, and discussed solely the effect of the statute
in that situation.
D. AGREETMENTS TO PAY A DEBT DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY
"Every agreement, promise or undertaking to pay a debt which
has been discharged by bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings."' -
This provision came into our law, by the revision of 1905213
Apparently it has never been construed.
II. WHAT FORMALITIES DOES THE STATUTE REQUIRE?
A. IN GENERAL
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed
by the party charged therewith." '64
As is the general rule, 5 the formalities of the statute are
satisfied by the existence of a number of papers, provided that
taken together and without the need of parol evidence to connect
them, they make out a complete statement of the transaction.'
The other cases are concerned with the problem of "express-
ing the consideration." The Minnesota statute attempted to settle
58Slingerland v. Slingerland, (1888) 39 Minn. 197, 39 N. W. 14o.
59Slingerland v. Slingerland, (1888) 39 Minn. 197, 39 N. W. 146;
Siewers v. Siewers, (1896) 65 Minn. 104, 67 N. V. 802; Haraldson v.
Knutson, (1919) 142 Minn. 109, 171 N. W. 201.
16 Siewers v. Siewers, (1896) 65 Minn. 104, 67 N. W. 802. For a
discussion of the principles involved in this case, see infra, text to footnotes
64 et seq.
r 1Haraldson v. Knutson, (1919) 142 Minn. 109, 171 N. WV. 201. For
a discussion of the principles involved in this case, see infra, text to
footnotes 117-123.62Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (4).63Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (4).6
'Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456.65Cf. Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., 470-474, sees 3461-349.
GGHalstead v. Minn. Tribune Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 294. 180 N. V. 556.
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the conflict of authority67 which existed elsewhere over the cor-
rectness of the rule of Wain v. Warlters,8 requiring the con-
sideration to be expressed, by enacting expressly the rule of that
case into the statute. But the court, while apparently observing
the phraseology of the statute, has frankly sought means of evad-
ing it. In an early case, 9 the court, after setting forth what it
conceived to be the object of the statute,70 said,
"But . . . it has never seemed to us that there was any neces-
sity in order to prevent the mischief aimed at, for requiring all
the motives and considerations which induced tile party to make
the promise, to be reduced to writing . . . The fact is that the ex-
pression of the consideration is so unnecessary in order to prevent
the mischief aimed at, and frequently so inconvenient, that the
courts have always been inclined to give this provision of the
statute a very liberal construction, which sometimes . . . re-
duces it to a mere formality."
7 1
The court, therefore, in accord with the weight of authority,
has held that the mere words, "for value received," were a good
expression of "the" consideration;72 and, in that same case, in a
dictum, approved the holdings of other courts that the statement
of a nominal, 73 or a false,7 4 consideration was sufficient, and also
the doctrine that a seal would meet the requirement.",
Vhether this suggestion is the best one or not is open to
considerable question. Even approving the court's declaration of
the object of the -statute, viz:
"To prevent men from being . . . held liable for engagements
which they never made . .. [by requiring that it] . . . be put into
the durable form of a writing and not left to the uncertainty of
verbal testimony ;76
it is submitted that if the party requires any protection from the
"uncertainty of verbal testimony" he requires it as much in the
67 For a discussion of both sides of this controversy, consult Browne,
Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., 521-532, secs. 386-398.
GbXVain v. Warlters, (1804) 5 East 10.
'OD. M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker, (1885) 34 Minn. 307, 25 N. \V. 0)6.
7
°The language of the court on this point has already been quoted,
footnote 46 supra.71D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker, (1885) 34 Minn. 307, 309-11, 25
N. W. 606.72D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker, (1885) 34 Minn. 307, 25 N. W. 006.73See Childs v. Barnum, (1851) 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 14.
74Happe v .Stout, (1852) 2 Cal. 460.7sChilds v. Barnum, (1851) 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 14; 1 Reed, Statute of
Frauds, 3931; but query whether this proposition is still valid, in view of
our statute, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 6933, abolishing private seals.
76D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker, (1885) 34 Minn. 307, 309, 25 N. W.
606. The statement is quoted in full, supra, footnote 46.
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determination of what he was to get as in the determination of
the making of some agreement. In fact, he may need it more.
The existence of some agreement may well be remembered by
witnesses, when the exact terms of it are lost. Hence too loose-
"liberal"--a construction of this requirement may well result in
depriving a party who has admittedly made sonic agreement of the
benefit he had expected thereby.
Of course these objections do not apply to the situation of the
main case. The phrase there sustained--"for value received"-
indicates that the promisor has at that moment received his bene-
fit, and, therefore, it becomes immaterial whether, in the future,
witnesses are able to remember what it was.
Clearly, there is no need, under any view, that the expression
of the consideration take any special form or manner. Hence,
it is sufficient if the whole instrument, on its face, indicates what
the consideration was. 77
B. EXPRESSING THE CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS OF GUARANTY.
The rules so far discussed apply equally to all four sub-divi-
sions. In addition, there are in Minnesota, a few cases which
lay down special rules for contracts under the second sub-
division.78
As we have seen, ordinarily the contract itself must indicate
the consideration. But in" contracts of guaranty, ordinarily the
consideration to the guarantor is solely the payment to the prin-
77Straight v. Wight,.(1895) 60 Minn. 515, 516-517, 63 N. W. 105:
"It is not necessary that the written memorandum should expressly state
what the consideration was. It is sufficient if, from the whole writing, it
appears with reasonable dearness what was the consideration upon which
the undertaldng was given." See Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v. Schnell,(1873) 20 Minn. 40 (33), where the court said: "It is not necessary that
the consideration should appear in express terms. It would undoubtedly
be sufficient, in any case, if the memorandum is so framed that any person
of ordinary capacity must infer, from the perusal of it, that such and no
other, was the consideration upon which the undertaking was given. Not
that a mere conjecture, however plausible, would be sufficient to satisfy
the statute, but there must be a well-grounded reference to be necessarily
collected from the terms of the memorandum."
See also Siewers v. Siewers, (1896) 65 Minn. 104, 105, 67 N. W. 802,
where the language used was: "It is not required that what the considera-
tion was shall be expressly stated, but upon what consideration the promise
or undertaldng was given must appear with reasonable clearness," but the
court held that an agreement reading, "I . . . promise to pay to . . .[plaintiff] . . . on the wedding day when she shall become my wife, the
sum of $1,000" did not satisfy the requirement.
'
8Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (2): "Every special promise to
answer for the debt, default, or doings of another"--supra, text to footnotes
55 and 56.
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cipal of the consideration for his promise. Hence the courts have
held that, if the contract of guaranty be given at the same time
that the principal debt is created, and refers to it. the considera-
tion is sufficiently expressed.79
But if there is no showing in the memorandum that the origi-
nal debt was not already in existence when the contract of guar-
anty was given, then the reference in it to the principal debt
can be made to refer only to a consideration which is "past,"
and, therefore, insufficient. On this basis, a guaranty that:
"We . . . are held and firmly bound to . . . [plaintiff)
in the penal sum of $500, for the payment of which we hereby
bind ourselves and our legal representatives firmly hy these
presents. Now, if . . . [the principal debtor] . . . redeems note
dated April 20th, for $500, which expires August 20th, in favor
of . . . [plaintiff] . . ., then the above to be void,"
was held bad under the statute, in the absence of any allegation
that it was made and delivered contemporaneously with the note
referred to."0
III. W'HAT IS THE EFFECT OF TIHE STATUTE?
"No action shall be maintained in either of the following cases,
upon any agreement,"8 etc.
We are here considering a case where the contract is one of
those for which the statute requires certain formalities, with which
the parties have not complied. What is the effect of tile above
language in such a case? Are the parties entirely remediless;
or is some relief open to them; and, if so, what?
The common mode of expressing this question is to inquire
whether the statute makes the contract "void," or merely "unen-
forceable." It is the writer's opinion that the Minnesota court
definitely has held that contracts under this section are not void.
79See Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v. Schnell, (1873) 20 Minn.40 (33):
" we think the weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that
the objection that the consideration is not stated does not apply to a guaranty
of a note when the written promise of the debtor sets forth a consideration
and the guaranty refers to the original indebtedness, and is nmade and
delivered at the same time therewith."
" Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v. Schnell, (1873) 20 Minn. 40 (33). On
the same theory, simply endorsing on a note, "I guarantee the collection
of the within note," was insufficient. Nichols, Shepard & Co. v. Allen,
(1877) 23 Minn. 542; and, clearly, a mere blank endorsement was bad.
Meer v. Folsom, (1869) 14 Minn. 340 (260).
8 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456.
62Johnson v. Albertson, (1892) 51 Minn. 333. 53 N. W. 642. For a
discussion of this case see infra, text to footnotes 90-97.
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but that the only effect of this section of the statute is to make
them unenforceable by an action ex contractu.
For over sixty-five years, there was but one case 2 even
remotely questioning this interpretation." On the other hand,
the breach of the terms of such an oral agreement was held to
be a defense to an action in quantum meruit for the part actually
performed, 4 on the theory that this was not maintaining an action
on the contract, but merely showing that no unjust enrichment
had taken place. 5
One of the most recent decisions seems to point in the same
direction. In Theopold v. Curtsingcr0 there had been an oral
lease for one year to begin in the future, in which the plaintiff
lessor had agreed to make certain repairs. The repairs not being
made, defendant moved out after eleven months of occupancy.
Plaintiff sued for the rent due for the last month and defendant
counterclaimed for damages for the failure to repair. The court
held that the statute did not apply, apparently on sonic idea of
estoppel. 87
But the court has gone even further than this. If the con-
tract had been performed, even though it could not be enforced
by a suit thereon, yet it could be used, in an action in quantum
53Dean Goodrich indicates that, in his opinion, one other case had
questioned this. (1919) 4 Iowa L. Bull. 184, 187, footnote 12 and text
thereto. But the case cited, Waite v. McKelvey, (1898) 71 Minn. 107, 72
N. W. 727, was concerned with the old section relating to the sale of guds.
G. S. 1913, sec. 6999, (since repealed, and replaced by the Uniform Sales
Act, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8379) whose language expressly de-
clared contracts coming under the terms of that section to be "void."5 Kriger v. Leppel, (1889) 42 Minn. 6, 43 N. W. 484.85
"Oral contracts of this description are not wholly void. No action,
it is true, can be maintained to enforce them. So far, however, as the
parties have voluntarily acted under and performed them, they are to be
taken as defining and measuring the rights of the parties." Kriger v
Leppel, (1889) 42 Minn. 6, 7, 43 N. AV. 484.
86(1927) 170 Minn. 105, 212 N. W. 18.
87
'TDefendant was in possession under a written lease until September
1, 1921, retained possession thereafter under the oral lease, and paid rent
for 11 months in accordance with its terms. . . . Certainly he was in no
position to disavow the contract or escape payment of rent for August
on the ground that the lease came within the statute of frauds.
"On the other hand, plaintiff, having accepted rent for 11 months under
the oral lease and having then sued to compel payment of the rent for
the last month of the term, could no longer be heard to say that the lease
was not binding upon him. ... Having acted to his detriment in reliance
on the promise, defendant may well say that plaintiff is now estopped from
asserting that the lease came within the statute of frauds. Therefore it
cannot be held as a matter of law that the counterclaim %vas uzenforceable
because of the statute." Theopold v. Curtsinger, (1927) 170 *Minn. 105,
108, 212 N. W. 18, 19:20 (Italics the author's).
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meruit for two purposes: first, to show that the performance on
the part of the plaintiff was not intended to be gratuitous; and,
second, as evidence of what was the "reasonable value" of that
performance."8
These cases, certainly, do not indicate that the contract was
"void." A void contract, by definition, creates no rights and
cannot be resorted to for any purpose.. A contract which "de-
fines and measures" the rights of the parties is more than a void
contract."9
True there is one case whose language might indicate a dif-
ferent view. In Johnson v. Albertson,0 there had been a parol
lease for one year to begin in futuro, a contract within the stat-
ute." The tenant had occupied the building for more than two
years, when he was evicted. He claimed to be protected for the
balance of the year, under the established doctrine that a tenant
for one year, who holds over, becomes, after a brief period, a
tenant from year to year.92 The court rejected tile plea, declining
to look to the oral contract for the purpose of determining the
length of his original term, and in so doing, spoke of the con-
tract as "void." It said:
"If the void lease can be looked at for the purpose of deter-
mining the duration of the term, the statute of frauds is evaded
beyond doubt; and the question whether the payment of rent was
made with reference to a yearly, monthly, or any other holding
should be determined without reference to the void demise .. .
If the void lease cannot be referred to during the first twelve
months for the purpose of determining the duration of the term,
(and all of the recent authorities go to this extent,) it is incon-
sistent and illogical to say that by the lapse of time, and by the
payment of rent after the expiration of the first year, precisely
as it was paid before, the inference of a new and valid contract
arises, which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, must con-
trol .'. . We are of the opinion that at no time can a parol demise,
void under the statute of frauds, be resorted to for the purpose
of ascertaining the duration of the term." 3
8sSpinney v. Hill, (1900) 81 Minn. 316, 84 N. W. 116; see Llly v.
Crookston Lbr. Co., (1902) 85 Minn. 257, 88 N. W. 846.
"Olt is recognized, of course, that strictly there can be no such thing as
a "void contract" since that is a contradiction in terms. The phrase has,
however, a well recognized meaning and is used here to save elaborate
circularity of expression.
90(1892) 51 Minn. 333, 53 N. W. 642.91Supra. text to footnotes 17-21.92Cf. 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., sec. 73.
93 Johnson v. Albertson, (1892) 51 Minn. 33.3, 336, 53 N. W. 642.
(Italics the author's).
STA.TUTE OF FRAUDS
If this language is to be taken at it face value, then this case
stands contra to the rule of the cases previously discussed. But
does it do so? It was not necessary for the court to find the
contract totally "void" in order to reach its decision. All that it
holds is that such an oral contract, whatever else may be done
with it, cannot be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the
period with reference to which rent was paid; and one of the
cases94 relied on to support the holding of this case expressly
pointed out this distinction. Support for this idea may be found,
also, in the fact that in the subsequent, analogous, case of Lally
v. Crookston Lbr. Co., 5 the court recognized that the contract
was not totally void,9 at the same time that it refused to look
to that contract for the purpose of determining whether an em-
ployee, kept on after his one year term was up, had been hired
for another full year. It would seem not improper to regard
the word "void" in Johnson v. Albcrtson97 as used without in-
tention to distinguish it from "unenforceable" and as meaning
only "within the bar of the statute."
The case of Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co.," has
been taken, generally, as indicating a contrary view. For this
reason, it deserves a full discussion. It was an action, in Minne-
sota, on a contract executed in Iowa, guaranteeing the payment
of rent on real estate located in Iowa. The contract was suffi-
cient under the Iowa statute of frauds ; but insufficient under
the Minnesota statute 10 for failure to express the consideration.
The real question was one of conflict of laws-whether the Iowa,
or the Minnesota, statute should be applied. Atcording to the
general principles of conflict of laws, this problem depended on
the subsidiary one of whether the Statute of Frauds related to
the "substance," in which case the Iowa law would apply, or to
procedure merely, in which case the Minnesota law would
govern.'01
In the leading English case, Leroux v. Brown.t1 " the court had
decided that this section of the statute related merely to procedure,
94 Vheeelr v. Frankenthal & Bro.. (1875) 78 Ill. 124.9 (1902) 85 Minn. 257, 88 N. W. 846.96Consult supra, text to footnote 88.
97(1892) 51 Minm. 333, 53 N. W. 642.
99(1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. AV. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777.
9 9Code of Iowa, se. 4625.
200Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456 (2).
'
0
°For a discussion of the problem of "right" and "remedy," consult
(1926) 11 IrNN oTA LAw Ravsxw, 44, especially pp. 50-53.
102(1852) 12 C. B. 801.
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and, therefore, that if the law of the forum had not been satisfied,
no suit could be brought on the foreign agreement. In reaching
this decision, the court drew a famous distinction between this
section and the old seventeenth section, based on the difference
between the use of the words "no action shall be brought" in the
instant section, and the words "no contract shall be allowed to be
good" in the other, and indicated that the latter words rendered
the contract void, hence related to the substance, and that a con-
tract under the latter section would have been enforceable in
England.
This distinction, based on a difference in language, the Miin-
nesota court refused to adopt, saying,
"... it is probably true that the legislators had no particular
reason in mind for the different phrasings in section 6998"'" and
6999,114 G.S. 1913, of our statute of frauds pertaining to similar
transactions. No doubt, the main object in the enactment of both
sections was to circumvent the occasion for perjury and conse-
quent fraud, by providing for written evidence in respect to cer-
tain contracts . . . . We believe no distinction should be made
between the two sections because of the use of the language 'no
action shall be maintained' in the one, and 'every contract shall
be void' in the other; but that the phrases, in the connection in
which they are used, mean one and the same thing, namely, to
make a valid contract in this state, concerning subjects men-
tioned in said sections, a writing is required ;,,100
and held that the statute was more than a mere rule of procedure,
and, therefore, that the Iowa statute applied.
It has been assumed by writers that this was, necessarily,
a decision that the Minnesota statute rendered contracts coming
under it "void." 10'  To the writer, this assumption does not
seem justified. Apparently the idea is that since, if the statute
did make the contract "void," it would affect the substance, there-
fore if it affects the substance, it must be because it is "void."
103Now Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8456.
104Now repealed, consult supra, footnote 83.
l05Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141,
146, 162 N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777.
106(1926) 11 MINNESOTA LAW REViFW 44, 51, note 28, "The Minnesota
court has held that there is no distinction in the language of the different
sections of the statute, holding the obligation in each instance void. and
that the statute concerned the substance, Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brew-
ing Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082. .. " (Italics the atuthor's) ;
consult also (1926) 11 MINNESOTA LJ-w REVmEW 78, 79; (1926) II Cornell
L. Quar. 361, 364, "Other courts hold that regardless of the words used
the statute makes a contract coming within its term void," citing this
case.
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But this does not necessarily follow. Professor Lorenzen has
pointed out a line of reasoning by which an "unenforceable" con-
tract may be deemed to affect the substance., This is not the
place to discuss the correctness of that view. For our present
purpose, it is immaterial what rule of conflict of laws is adopted
in relation to the statute. If this was the view adopted by the
court, then the writer is correct in his belief that the statute
of frauds in Minnesota does not affect the validity of the con-
tract.
. Apparently such was the view of the court. In the previous
case of Hanson v. Mfarion,'" it had been urged by the plaintifflo"
that the statute was only a rule of evidence, and, hence, since
he had been allowed to introduce evidence of the oral agreement
without objection, the rule that "incompetent evidence is sufficient
proof of a fact when received without objection" should apply
and the defendant be now estopped from raising the question
of the statute. The court rejected the idea that the statute was
only a rule of evidence, saying:
"The language of the statute is that 'no action shall be main-
tained' upon the contracts there referred to unless in writing,
and though the statute may be waived by the party entitled to
invoke it, it is clear that the legislature intended by its enact-
ment something more than a mere rule of evidence. If the
statute declared that no evidence of such a contract was admis-
sible unless in writing, the construction claimed for it would be
well grounded. But it does not so read, and the construction
of the statute heretofore has been that the contract is unenforce-
able, and not as a limitation of the mode of proof."""o
In other words, the statute determines what constitutes an
actionable fact-not the mode of proving that fact.
'
07Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, (1923)
32 Yale L. J. 311; Consult also (1926) 10 MI. txsorA LAw R~view, 268.
108(1915) 128 Minn. 468, 151 N. W. 195.
109The court says, 128 Minn. 468, 473, that defendant raised this point.
This is an obvious slip-the briefs show that it was raised by plaintiff,
and, in the nature of things, he is the only one who would.
116Hanson v. Marion, (1915) 128 Minn. 468, 473-4, 151 N. W. 195.
This view seems correct. See Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the
Conflict of Laws, (1923) 32 Yale L. Jour. 311, 324. The statute of frauds
is not a rule of evidence at all. It may furnish the occasion for the
operation of a rule of evidence-namely, the so-called "best evidence rule";
but if the requirements of that rule are met, as for example, by proof of the
loss or destruction of the note or memorandum, oral evidence of the
contents of that writing are admissible, consult Siewers v. Siewers,
(1896) 65 Minn. 104, 67 N. W. 802.
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In two subsequent cases, reference has been made to the
Halloran Ca-se." In both, it has been treated as not inconsistent
with considering contracts within the terms of the statute as
"unenforceable" merely. In Matson. v. Baunan " it was treated
as simply laying down a rule of conflict of laws ;113 while, in its
last pronouncement on the point, O.rborough v. St. Martin,"' the
court cited the HalloranL Case"' as authority for an even more
extreme position than it had previously taken, namely, that even
contracts under one of the "land" sections of the statute"' could
be used as evidence in an action in quantumn meruit, in spite of
the fact that the language of the section there in question more
clearly referred to validity than that of the section which is the
subject of this article.' 7
In Haraldson v. Knutson" 18 is to be found a further indica-
tion that this section of the statute does not make contracts void.
In that case there had been an antenuptial marriage settlement,
which, while reduced to writing, was not signed until after the
marriage. It was argued that the statute should be taken as nak-
ing the antenuptial agreement void, and hence, that the writing
when executed was a postnuptial settlement, and the Halloran
"'Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141,
162 N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777.
112(1918) 139 Minn.'296, 166 N. W. 343.
"13"In Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141,
162 N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777, it was held, in respect to the question
of the statute of frauds, that a contract made and to be performed in another
state, by parties residing therein, must be controlled as to the sufficiency of
the written agreement by the law of that state," Matson v. Bauman, (1918)
139 Minn. 296, 299, 166 N. W. 343.
114(1926) 169 Minn. 72, 210 N. W. 854.
"l'Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162
N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777.
"Z6Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8459.
"17"There is a verbal difference in the statute of frauds as applied
to different subject matters upon which some courts base a distinction,
holding that in the instances where the statute refers to the contract as
void it is not admissible for any purposes. We have held that there
should be no such distinction. Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co. 137
Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777." Oxborough v. St.
Martin, (1926) 169 Minn. 72, 73, 210 N. W. 854. In other words, in
Minnesota, apparently, if this language is to be accepted, no contract
is made utterly without legal consequences by any section of the Statute
of Frauds. The possibility of this far reaching importance of this case
seems to have been overlooked by the commentators upon it, (1927) 40
Harv. L. Rev. 648; (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 337, they discussing only
whether it is proper to use the oral contract as evidence of reasonable
value in addition to using it as evidence of whether the services were in-
tended to be gratuitous.
118(1919) 142 Minn. 109, 171 N. W. 201.
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Case'n9 was cited'20 to the court as authority for such an inter-
pretati6n of the statute. The court rejected this interpretation,
though without reference to the previous case, and held that the
original agreement was not totally "void," but merely "unen-
forceable i' and subject to being made fully valid by a subsequent
memorandum, signed at any time, even after marriage.12'
The court in thfis case uses language which is, in view of the
other cases, open to criticism. In one place it says: "The dis-
tinction, where a statute declares a contract void if not made in
compliance with its provisions, and where it provides that no
action shall be maintained thereon, is clear." 22 To draw in this
manner a distinction from the varying language of different sec-
tions is, clearly, contra to the previous decision in the Halloran
Case, 23 and has since been again disapproved in the Oxborough
Case.1'4 But this language, was not necessary to the decision,
and, even if it is incorrect, the case is still good authority for the
"unenforceable" nature of contracts within the statute.
Since, then, all the cases before and after the Halloran Case'
have refused to consider this section of the statute of frauds as
"g9 Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162
N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777.
i2 0"For here no distinction is to be made between 'void' as it reads
in section 6997, and the wording of sec. 6998 of R. L [G.S.] 1913. Halloran
v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co., (1917) 137 Minn. [141], 146," 162 N. W.
1082, L R. A. 1917E 777. Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-9.
1
-°For a collection of the authorities on the rule of this case, consult
(1926) 11 M NmEsomA LAW REvIm-v 78. As already indicated, the expres-
sion of doubt, contained in that discussion, as to the Minnesota rule, is,
in my opinion, unjustified. The same situation has recently been before
the supreme court of South Dakota, under a statute reading, "The follow-
ing contracts are invalid. . ." S. D. Rev. Code 1919. sec. 855. That court
followed the line of authority based on the terminology of the statute and
held, following two Wisconsin cases, Brandeis v. Neustadtl, (1860) 13 Wis.
142 and Rowell v. Barber, (1910) 142 Wis. 304, 125 N. W. 937, 27 L. R- A.
[N.S.] 1140, that its statute made all agreements not conforming to the
requirements "void," and, therefore, that it could not be validated by any
subsequent act. In re Peterson's Estate, (S.D. 1929) 226 N. W. 641.
For a discussion of the Wisconsin rule, which is based on the terminology.
conslIt Page, Failure to Comply with the Wisconsin Statute of Frauds,
(1928) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 323.
'
2 2 Haraldson v. Knutson, (1919) 142 Minn. 109, 111, 171 N. W. 201.
2 3Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co., (1917) 177 Minn. 141, 162
N. W. 1082, L R. A. 1917E 777.
124 Oxborough v. St. Martin, (1926) 169 Minn. 72, 210 N. W. 854.
1-2 5 Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162
N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777.
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making contracts totally "void," and since that case can be ex-
plained on a theory other than the "void" nature of the ceontract
involved, there seems to be no reason for assuming that contracts
falling under this section are anything more than "unen forceable"
by an action in the nature of a suit on the contract.
